INTRODUCTION
Since its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO)' in 2001,2 China has been the subject of much scrutiny in terms of its compliance with WTO policies and regulations. 3 While government agencies in the United States generally agree that China has made significant progress toward implementing its WTO commitments, there are several aspects of China's commitments that it has yet to fulfill. 4 One such insufficiency is that China still maintains policies of differential tax treatment toward its domestic industries, favoring domestic production and discriminating against imports. 5 The objectionable effect of these practices is that China is able to enjoy the advantages of trading in an international forum while restricting access to its own market by foreign competitors. 6 As China is a rapidly rising force in the world economy, it is apparent why China would take steps toward full compliance with the WTO in some respects and yet still provide excessive tax relief or other incentives for industries in which China wants to drastically improve its international competitiveness. 7 The goal of this policy appears to be twofold. First, it allows China to point to its ostensible progress in becoming fully compliant with the WTO so that it can further its integration into the world economy with WTO approval. 8 Second, maintaining domestically favorable tax and subsidy policies enables China to accelerate growth and production of its own manufacturers, boost exports, and thus gradually overtake a significant market share in industries in which China has traditionally been a major importer. 9 However, as long as China continues to implement differential tax incentives and subsidies, the United States and other WTO Member states will have an enormous comparative disadvantage in such subsidized industries.' 0 For example, if China should subsidize its steel manufacturers contingent upon exports per year and simultaneously increases tariffs on steel imports, then China would be able to sell steel around the world at low prices with which international competitors would likely be unable to compete.' This and other unfair trade practices are precisely what the WTO seeks to prevent,1 2 and they are precisely what China agreed to discontinue when it acceded to the WTO in 2001 and became bound by the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 13 One industry in which China has historically been a major importer, and has only recently become a global economic force in itself, is the automobile industry. 14 China's increase in net production since 2000 has positioned it far in advance of other potential major automobile producers such as Brazil and Thailand, and it has launched China to third place in world leaders for auto production, surpassing Korea and Germany and trailing only Japan and the United States. " Not only has China's auto production rapidly escalated in the past decade, but the compact cars it is producing are very inexpensive.1 6 This may have a devastating effect on the United States automobile industry, as major U.S. manufacturers almost certainly could not compete with Chinese manufacturers' low prices.' 7 Such price disparity has also aroused suspicions of unfair subsidization practices in China.' 8 One way a company can produce products at or below the cost of raw materials without losing money is through receipt of government subsidies.' 9 In addition to mere suspicions, the Chinese government has actually engaged in several questionable subsidization practices to promote its own industry. 20 These include: 1) establishing export quotas in 2007 to determine the amount of state funding for its manufacturers, and 2) requiring high levels of domestic content for joint ventures -from requiring forty percent local content at the outset to requiring eighty percent by the third year. 21 These policies aim to enhance Chinese export volume and promote domestic over imported goods. 22 They are also illegal according to the WTO. 23 All major players in the automotive industry have serious economic interests in Chinese compliance with the WTO. 24 The United States, however, has an especially large stake in demanding Chinese compliance in its production of automobiles: as China prepares to introduce its automobiles in the U.S. market in the near future, 25 it becomes crucial to U.S. competitiveness that China engages in fair trading practices. There are three major purposes of this Note. First, this Note aims to determine the extent to which major Chinese automobile manufacturers are subsidized by the Chinese government, as relative to the extent to which other global industry leaders are subsidized by their respective governments, including Korea, Germany, Japan, and the United States. 26 It should be noted that obtaining precise and accurate subsidy figures for each of the manufacturers scrutinized in this Note is an expensive procedure that could take years to accomplish, even for sophisticated government agencies or the WTO itself. 27 Such a task is beyond the scope of this Note. Instead, this Note will utilize the public financial information of each of the manufacturers, allegations of WTO violations, and other sources of evidence to develop estimates of the relative degrees of subsidization employed by each of the countries surveyed herein. 28 Second, having established relative degrees of subsidization, this Note will analyze whether and how these subsidies are illegal according to the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 29 This Note will discuss the countervailing measures available to other Member states of the WTO against those states found to be illegally subsidizing their auto manufacturers.
STEPHEN COONEY, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS
Third, this Note will analyze the macroeconomic effects of noncompliance with the WTO through use of prohibited subsidies, and it will contemplate how full compliance would affect international automotive trade. 3°T his analysis will also discuss the practical reasons for illegalizing certain types of subsidies. It will examine the actual weight of WTO authority along with the effectiveness of the WTO's current remedies for violations.
Part I of this Note will provide background information as to the history of the Chinese automobile industry. It will shed light on China's rise in economic status as an automotive power and will lead into an introduction of the biggest Chinese manufacturers in the industry: First Automotive Works, Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation, and Dongfeng Motor Corporation. 3 Part III will report approximate amounts of subsidies received by the top three auto manufacturers in China, as compared to subsidization of a top manufacturer in each of the other industry-leading countries: Korea, Germany, Japan, and the United States. An analysis of the legality of these subsidies and their macroeconomic effects on the global automobile industry will then invite discussion of currently available remedies for the adverse effects of noncompliance.
Part IV of this Note will provide a reassessment of the effectiveness of the remedies and will also weigh the relative authority of the WTO. This section will also demonstrate the importance of a system of international trade that calls for transparency and accountability, focusing on trade practices in the global automobile industry. Part V will conclude by revisiting the rationale for the very existence of the WTO: fair international trade. The results and analysis of parts IH and IV will provide grounds for recommendations to help ensure global fair trade. These include altering and increasing the severity of the consequences of noncompliance with the WTO, and also allowing unilateral action by a country injured through another's WTO violations so that it may close its own markets to the violator until full compliance is manifest. 32 Finally, the accounting system of each Member state of the WTO should be required to meet a WTOapproved set of accounting principles, thus demanding the same degree of transparency from every Member state. 33 This would improve the accountability of all Member states while allowing them to keep, though perhaps reform, their own systems, without attempting to implement a uniform WTO accounting system. 3 4 These measures would collectively increase the effectiveness of the WTO, promote fairer trade in the auto industry, and protect the United States from unfair competition with Chinese auto manufacturers in the very near future. 35 were a minimal number of miles of paved roadways throughout the country; for example, in 1937 there were approximately 25,000 miles of paved roadway in China, whereas there were 1.3 million miles of paved roadway in the United States by 1935.38 Second, the low standard of living meant that, for many workers, it was virtually impossible to afford an automobile, nor did it make sense to purchase one when rickshaws and horse carts were much more efficient means of transportation. 39 Third, the political climate deterred potential buyers: as civil wars broke out and continued during the 1920's, automobiles were often confiscated by feuding warlords. 4° During the 1930's to mid-1940's, a few small-scale Chinese manufacturers began producing small numbers of automobiles, mainly manufacturing trucks. ' Although production was minimal during World War II, the newly founded People's Republic of China set an initiative almost immediately to develop a domestic automobile industry. 42 Soon after, with the assistance of the former Soviet Union, China opened its first automobile manufacturer on July 13, 1956, known as First Automotive Works. 43 This production facility originally produced only one model of medium-sized truck and later began manufacturing compact automobiles. 44 In 1958, China's leader Mao Zedong launched an idealist plan he termed the "Great Leap Forward," which was an attempt to bolster China's economy primarily through extremely expedient 36. ERIc The chaos of the Cultural Revolution led to a twelve percent decrease in general industrial production from 1966 to 1968. 53 The Chinese auto industry took an upward swing in the early 1970s. 54 In 1971, China engaged the largest Japanese auto manufacturer, Toyota, as a trading partner; from this point, Toyota and the Chinese began to cooperate by exchanging technicians, jointly producing new automobile models, and developing an automotive plant. 55 6° With a plethora of small-scale manufacturers having sprouted across China, the government saw a need to consolidate production as a strategy to create a smaller number of large-scale, internationally competitive manufacturers, a policy which is still in place today. 6 ' China has been successful in restructuring its industry and channeling production, resulting in a handful of present-day automotive giants that continue to rise in the global economy. 6 2
See infra

C. The Chinese "Big Three": First Automotive Works, Dongfeng Motor Group, and Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation 63
While there are approximately 120 auto manufacturers in China, only ten produce over 100,000 units annually. 64 Among these ten are the Chinese "Big Three," including First Automotive Works (FAW), Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (Group) (SAIC), and Dongfeng Motor (Group) Corporation (DFM), ranked first through third respectively. 65 The Chinese government especially supports these three manufacturers through subsidies, loans, and priority in establishing joint ventures with foreign manufacturers in order to draw international investment, fund advanced technology, and attract [Vol. 19:1 management expertise. 66 The third largest Chinese auto manufacturer, DFM, formerly known as Second Automotive Works (SAW), was established in 1969 and has opened multiple major production bases since. 67 These centers are located in Shiyan, Xiangfan, Wuhan, and Guangzhou, and they specialize in the production of medium and heavy duty commercial vehicles, light duty commercial vehicles, and passenger vehicles. 68 Today, DFM production is mainly divided between commercial and passenger vehicles. 69 Contributive to its expansion in the passenger vehicles sector, DFM has engaged in joint ventures with Nissan Motor Co., Ltd.; Honda Motor Co., Ltd.; and Kia Motors Corporation. 7°A major aspect of DFM's corporate strategy under CEO Xu Ping is Research and Development (R&D). 71 DFM's goals for the next five years include doubling production and sales, strengthening as an internationally competitive manufacturer, and increasing its capability for autonomic development. 7 2 In furtherance of these goals, Donfeng Automobile Co., Ltd. announced in October, 2007 that it will be investing V 10 billion through 2010 to develop its DFM brand. 73 SAIC, the second largest Chinese auto manufacturer, was established in the 1950s and began production in 1958.74 While SAIC's flagship production center is in Shanghai, it has established bases in Liuzhou, Chongqing, Yantai, Shenyang, Qingdao, and Yizheng, and it also has branches in the United States, Europe, Hong Kong, Japan, and Korea. 75 automobile manufacturer with an annual output of over 230,000 cars. 77 SAIC is also party to a joint venture with General Motors (GM), which is the largest Sino-American joint venture in China. 78 The corporate strategy of SAIC under the leadership of President Shen Jianhua centers on the idea of "becoming a corporation of industrial investment and business operation that integrates advanced manufacturing and modem service businesses., 79 One of its goals is to help build an energy-efficient, environmentally-friendly, and maintainable automobile industry. 80 To realize this goal, SAIC announced in October of 2007 that GM and SAIC will jointly be investing $5 million in five years to establish a "vehicular energy technological R&D center" in coordination with Qinghua University, in order to devise a comprehensive energy strategy for China and its auto industry. 8 '
The current largest of the "Big Three" Chinese auto manufactures is the same one that started it all for the Chinese auto industry in 1956: First Automotive Works (FAW). 8 2 FAW production bases are located in Jilin and Heilongjiang provinces in northeast China, Shandong province in east China, Hainan province in south China, and Sichuan and Yunnan provinces in southwest China. 83 While FAW initially only produced one model of medium truck, FAW now produces a diversified array of vehicles, including light, medium, and heavy-duty trucks; cars, buses and luxury tourist coaches, custom bus chassis, and compact vehicles. 84 Its sales volume has surpassed one million units annually. 85 FAW has multiple joint ventures with foreign manufacturers, the largest of which being Volkswagen, Toyota, and Mazda, which deal primarily with passenger vehicles. 86 Under the leadership of President Zhu Yanfeng, the corporate strategy is currently to place heavier emphasis on the production of passenger vehicles while still holding a dominant position in the commercial truck sector. 87 also focuses intently on R&D, possessing the largest and most comprehensive automotive R&D center in China. 88 In an effort to advance its research capabilities, FAW announced in August that it will be spending ¥13 billion over the next eight years "to enhance its competitiveness in the automobile, commercial truck, and bus sectors." 89 Although the Chinese auto industry had modest beginnings and endured several setbacks in times of war and political upheaval, it started to see rapid improvement in the mid-1980s as it became more technically advanced and more open to partnerships with foreign manufacturers. 9° China first passed the mark of two million units produced per year in 2000 (including all types of vehicles), and since then it has surpassed France, South Korea, and Germany in annual production rates. 9 ' By 2006, China had more than tripled its 2000 production output, producing a total of approximately 7.19 million units. 92 Not only is China still improving its own auto industry, but it is the only country in the world that continues to show substantial growth in production. 9 3 As China's auto industry progresses exponentially and its major manufacturers aim to compete with Japanese and American giants, it becomes imperative now more than ever that the major players in the global auto industry secure assurance of fair international trade practices. 94 PART In acceding to the WTO, China agreed to be bound by a series of regulations and policies which require it to not only restructure its laws to open its markets, but also to be transparent and accountable in its trade practices.' 0 3
Article 2(C) of the Accession of the People's Republic of China delineates this transparency requirement: "China shall make available to WTO Members, upon request, all laws, regulations and other measures pertaining to or affecting trade in goods, services, TRIPS [trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights] or the control of foreign exchange before such measures are implemented or enforced."' 4 The Accession agreement further provides that China's progress in implementing the WTO Agreement will be subject to annual review every year for eight years after accession.
0 5 The purpose of this is to ensure that China is moving toward policies of transparency. 106 Having scrutinized China's steps toward fully implementing its WTO commitments over the first four to five years post-accession, experts have found mixed results.1 0 7 On one hand, China has met several of the commitments 8 it was scheduled to fulfill by the fifth year of its WTO membership. 1 0 9 Some of the areas in which China is compliant include the "advertising, banking, architectur [ Although there has been significant delay in notification to the WTO of its subsidization programs, this does not mean that the subsidies China employs are necessarily illegal. In fact, many of them may be legal and even "nonactionable"" 1 5 according to the WTO. 1 6 The determination of whether China uses illegal subsidies, particularly in its automobile industry, depends on how its subsidies are categorized according to the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.
B. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
The WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) addresses the problem of government support of domestic industries to the detriment of other countries participating in the same market.1 7 The Agreement clearly defines what constitutes a subsidy according to the WTO, and it also provides remedial measures to those Member states that have been injured by another's use of unacceptable subsidies. 18 The main purpose of the Agreement is to curtail government assistance that economically disadvantages other WTO Member states. 19 Article 1 of Part I of the SCM Agreement defines at length "subsidy" for purposes of the Agreement. 
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[A] subsidy shall be deemed to exist if: (a) (1) The extensiveness of this definition of "subsidy" illustrates that there are several methods by which a government could directly or indirectly provide financial support to industries within its borders.1 2 1 Without any further limitations, it would be a monumental but futile effort to try to determine instances of subsidization because there would be no test by which to analyze potential subsidies. The SCM Agreement, however, establishes a specificity requirement, which deems that a subsidy will only be subject to the provisions of the SCM Agreement if it is "specific" according to Article 2 of the Agreement. 1
22
A specific subsidy is one that is "specific to an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries ... within the jurisdiction of the granting authority" and is subject to a set of three principles. 123 First, "(a) [w] here the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to which the granting authority operates, explicitly limits access to a subsidy to certain enterprises, such subsidy shall be specific."' 24 Second, if the granting authority or its legislation establishes criteria "(b) ... governing the eligibility for, and the amount of, a subsidy, specificity shall not exist, provided that the eligibility is automatic and that such criteria and conditions are strictly adhered to."' 25 The third principal is a sort of catchall: if a subsidy is not specific under parts (a) or (b), it still may be found specific based on other factors such as: "use of a subsidy programme by a limited number of certain enterprises, predominant use by certain enterprises, the granting of disproportionately large amounts of subsidy to 120 certain enterprises, and the manner in which discretion has been exercised by the granting authority in the decision to grant a subsidy.', 126 In other words, if a certain subsidy seems too singular to a certain enterprise, it will be considered specific and therefore it will be subject to scrutiny under the SCM Agreement. 127 To summarize, Part I of the SCM Agreement defines "subsidy," stipulates that in order for a subsidy to be subject to the provisions of the Agreement it must be "specific," and then provides a three-part test to determine whether specificity exists for a given subsidy. 28 Parts 11, III, and IV of the SCM Agreement are crucial to the determination of whether a WTO Member state's subsidization programs are illegal.' 29 These sections of the Agreement respectively establish three categories of subsidies: Prohibited, Actionable, and Non-Actionable.
3°S
ubsidies are prohibited when they are "contingent, in law or in fact, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon export performance" or "contingent . . . upon the use of domestic over imported goods."' 13 1 This provision not only prohibits WTO Member states from granting such subsidies, but also requires Members to immediately terminate prohibited subsidies if they already existed in that country when it acceded to the WTO.132 This has become a problem particularly with China; it was required per its Accession Agreement to notify the WTO of, and terminate, all prohibited subsidies upon accession. 133 As this commitment has yet to be fulfilled, the United States has initiated proceedings against China 34 according to WTO dispute resolution procedures.
35
There are several reasons for prohibiting export subsidies and subsidies contingent upon use of domestic over imported goods.' 36 One is that these types of subsidies heavily promote consumption of only domestically produced 126 The second category of subsidies under the SCM Agreement is actionable subsidies."4° A subsidy is actionable if it causes "adverse effects to the interests of other Members" such as "(a) injury to the domestic industry of another Member; (b) nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly or indirectly to other Members ... ; [or] (c) serious prejudice to the interests of another Member."' 141 The SCM Agreement then enumerates what constitutes serious prejudice: subsidization of a product in excess of fifteen percent, subsidization to cover operating losses of an industry or enterprise, and "direct forgiveness of debt.' ' 14 2 A country may be injured by this prejudice when the effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede its exports, to undercut its prices, or to increase the market share of the subsidizing state. 43 These subsidies may not always adversely affect other Member states; thus, the purpose of classifying them as "actionable" is to provide remedial measures to states that do suffer injury from these subsidies. 44 The third category of subsidies is non-actionable subsidies. A subsidy is non-actionable if it is non-specific or if it is specific but meets the conditions outlined in Article 8 of the SCM Agreement.
145 Specific non-actionable subsidies include financial assistance with research, "assistance to disadvantaged regions," or assistance in adapting existing facilities to comply with new environmental regulations. 146 These subsidies are non-actionable because they do not favor particular industries over others, and therefore do not foster a market advantage that would be detrimental to other Member states. 147 Non-actionable subsidies are beyond the concern of this Note insofar as they are not themselves illegal; therefore, China's current use of them in the automobile industry would be of no legal consequence. However, nonactionable subsidies may be suspect in the sense that a country could foreseeably attempt to claim an actionable subsidy as non-actionable. Of the three types of subsidies provided in the SCM Agreement, prohibited and actionable subsidies are of special importance for purposes of analyzing China's WTO compliance in the auto industry. These are the subsidies that amount to unfair trade practices, and these may have the most injurious effect on the United States and other world leaders in automobile production as China begins, or continues, to market its cars in these forums. Consideration of the remedies available to states injured by such illegal subsidization reveals that dispute resolution is largely left to the Member states themselves. 150 
C. Dispute Resolution Under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
Article 4 and Article 7 of the SCM Agreement provide for remedies in the event that one WTO Member state suspects that another is maintaining either prohibited or actionable subsidies, respectively.' 5 ' The first step in the dispute resolution procedure in actions regarding prohibited subsidies is that the state claiming to have been injured by another's use of illegal subsidies initiates consultations with the allegedly offending state in an attempt to reach a solution between themselves. 52 If this fails after thirty days, either party may refer the matter to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) for establishment of a panel to resolve the dispute. 53 This DSB "aims to resolve disputes by clarifying the rules of the multilateral trading system; it cannot legislate or promulgate new rules." 54 The DSB's panel, with the assistance of a Permanent Group of Experts (PGE), reviews the evidence and allows the allegedly offending Member state to demonstrate that the practice in question is not a prohibited subsidy. 155 The panel then issues its conclusions, and if it finds that a prohibited subsidy exists, the DSB will recommend its immediate termination. 56 If this report is not followed within the time period allotted by the panel, the DSB may authorize the allegedly injured country to "take The dispute resolution process for actionable subsidies is similar to that of prohibited subsidies.' 6 One major difference is that, at the outset, the complaining state has the burden of proof to show that it has in fact sustained an injury. 161 The parties may then engage in consultations, as with prohibited subsidy dispute resolution, but in this case they have sixty instead of thirty days to reach a solution.' 62 If that fails, a DSB-appointed panel will consider the matter and issue a report. 163 Finally, if an actionable subsidy is found to exist and has adversely affected another Member, the DSB will require the offending Member to remove the adverse effects or terminate the subsidy within sixty days.164 If there is no compliance, the DSB will authorize "countermeasures, commensurate with the degree and nature of the adverse effects determined to exist . ..., 165 This ambiguous language poses a problem similar to that of "appropriate countermeasures," offered as the remedy for injury by prohibited subsidies.'66 The SCM Agreement does not provide any clarification regarding what type of action would be suitable.' 67 When the ultimate means of recourse is "an eye for an eye" 68 counteraction between the parties themselves, the WTO seems to have washed its hands of dealing with any actual conflict. 159. Cf Center for Int'l Development at Harvard, supra note 154 (stating that the dispute resolution procedure "gives the WTO unprecedented power to resolve trade-related conflicts between nations and assign penalties and compensation to the parties involved"). For recommendations regarding the authority of the WTO and the dispute resolution system currently in place, see infra, Part IV-V.
160. See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 12, at Part III- 168. Known also as the Law of Retribution, the Bible describes this concept in Exodus 21: 22-27.
IV.
169. The phrase "washing ones hands" comes from the Bible and refers to Pontius Pilot washing his hands to symbolize his refusal to take action or responsibility for the crucifixion of Jesus Christ. Matthew 27: 24.
[Vol. 19:1 THE CHINESE AuTo INDUSTRY AND THE WTO Again, this leads to the conclusion that the WTO has extremely limited authority. Some Member states, such as China, may find this to be a disincentive to comply with WTO regulations in the first place.' 70 Part V of this Note will reexamine these remedies in light of evidence of subsidization practices currently employed in the global auto industry.' 71 When China acceded to the WTO, it became party to a number of agreements, including the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.1 72 China thereby incurred the commitment to notify the WTO of any and all subsidies it had in place, a commitment which has yet to be fulfilled even after the United States and Mexico initiated WTO cases against China.
Although progress in Chinese transparency with regard to subsidies has been relatively unhurried, 74 this does not mean its subsidies are per se illegal.' We have seen that there are three categories of subsidies, only one of which is always illegal, and another of which is only illegal depending on whether it adversely affects other states.' 76 These two -prohibited and actionable subsidies, respectively -pose significant problems for fair trade.' 77 Keeping in mind China's commitments and WTO law on subsidies, let us revisit the Chinese auto industry to determine the extent to which China is WTOcompliant in this microcosm of global trade. [r]ecipient." 178 The following are not considered to confer benefits unless they are provided in a manner inconsistent with how the enterprise would otherwise conduct business with a private entity: "government provision of equity capital," "a loan by a government," "a loan guarantee by a government," and "the provision of goods or services or purchase of goods by a government."' ' 79 While this places some limitations on what can be considered a subsidy, it does not give any guidance as to how to calculate subsidy amounts. 80 A logical method of calculating the subsidies granted to a certain corporation is to look at the company's financial statements. 81 A firm might disclose the amount of government assistance it receives annually, although this is rare and there may be no telling whether this number is comprehensive of all types of subsidies.
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If there are no direct disclosures, one may find subsidies by scrutinizing the income taxes paid (as compared to national corporate income tax rates), research and development grants, and interest rates paid on loans (as compared to standard interest rates).1 8 3
The above methods for determining subsidies may or may not render accurate results. As Economic Analyst Andrew Szamosszegi aptly notes, "Quantification is difficult because much of the raw data and information required to calculate subsidies is unavailable."' 184 Even if the information does exist, access to this may be very restricted:
In a subsidy investigation, the Department of Commerce collects detailed data from mandatory respondents and the subsidizing government. The Department then sends officials to view the books of the respondents and verify the information received. This information is only seen by officials and people who certify that they will not divulge any proprietary information. 1 85 Thus, with limited access to limited information, the subsidization amounts calculated and discussed herein should be considered rough 186 estimates.
In some cases, even basic financial information is unavailable, thus affording no basis (for the purposes of this Note) for determining figures.
187
B.
Subsidy Estimates: The Chinese "Big Three" Auto Manufacturers
To recall from Part I, the Chinese "Big Three" in the automobile industry include First Automotive Works (FAW), Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC), and Dongfeng Motors Corporation (DFM). 188 For the year 2006, FAW's income was V¥163.7 billion, 18 9 and its assets are currently valued at V102.4 billion ($12.4 billion). 190 It is not clear, however, what amount of this income and what percentage of these assets come through government assistance. While FAW does ostensibly post its annual reports on its website, they are only illegible pictures of the annual reports and not the documents themselves. 191 No other means of accessing the reports seems available at this time without purchasing the information for a heavy price.
92
While this information would be highly useful for analysis, its absence nonetheless strongly supports a conclusion of lacking Chinese transparency and a recommendation that the annual reports of all companies under the umbrella of the WTO should be publicly available to other Member states. 1 93 Further, these annual reports should be required to be prepared in accordance with a standard set of accounting principles which the WTO should adopt. This will heighten accountability of trade practices worldwide. Further discussion of these recommendations continues in Part IV.1 94 SAIC posts its annual reports on its website, although they are virtually DFM, the third auto manufacturer of the Chinese "Big Three," does not furnish annual reports on its website. 2°2 However, evidence of specific subsidies to DFM is available through a recent study submitted to the U.S. International Trade Commission.
2 3 One area of concern with DFM is its access to preferential loans. However, "market-based interest rates in 2005 were approximately 9.4 percent for short-term loans and 10.4 percent for long-term loans. ' '2°6 The difference between the interest expense of ¥694 million and ¥485 million actually paid in interest amounts to ¥209 million. 20 7 A second area of concern is R&D incentives. 2°8 DFM received government grants of ¥464 million in 2005 for research and development in automotive technology. 2°9 While this subsidy is not prohibited under the SCM Agreement, it may be actionable depending on whether it has adverse effects on other Member states. 210 Subsidies in the form of R&D grants and export subsidies are suspected for SAIC, 2 1 and subsidies have been more affirmatively calculated for DFM in the form of R&D grants and preferential loans. A strict set of WTO accounting principles and specific transparency requirements, coupled with heightened WTO authority, would theoretically bring about Chinese auto manufacturers' full disclosure of their finances, including government assistance.
C. Subsidy Estimates for the Other World Leaders in the Automobile Industry
We have seen that China likely grants subsidies to its major auto manufacturers -subsidies which remain undisclosed. However, if the largest auto manufacturers in the world engage in the same practices, then the question whether there is really unfair trade in the industry becomes more difficult to answer, and the WTO' s ability to control subsidization becomes compromised. In terms of motor vehicle production, the current world leaders in the auto industry include, in descending rank: Japan, the United States, China, Germany, and South Korea. 21 7 An investigation into the extent of subsidization for the top manufacturer of each of these countries will help determine whether the leading nations in the industry are WTO-compliant and how authoritative the WTO regulations actually are.
Japan's largest auto manufacturer, also the largest in the world, is Toyota 223 This subsidy resulted in a reduction in the 2006 retirement benefits expense by $270 million. 224 According to the SCM Agreement, this would likely be categorized as a non-actionable subsidy because it is not specific. 225 Recall that in order to be specific, a subsidy must affect a certain industry or enterprise; whereas the subsidy in this case is mandated by legislation and would affect employees across all U.S. industries.
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Although this is the only subsidy that it discloses, Ford, like Toyota, publishes comprehensive annual reports with detailed explanations of its financial statements. 227 Thus, even if these companies do not expressly claim all of their subsidies, calculating subsidy amounts is not as difficult for these companies as it is for Chinese manufacturers who publish only limited information and in minimally functional format.
The largest German auto manufacturer is Volkswagen. 22 8 While this company does not disclose any government subsidies in its Annual Report, there are suspect areas where Volkswagen may be receiving undisclosed government assistance. 229 In its Notes to the Consolidated Financial Statements, under Revenue and Expense Recognition, the report notes that "[g]ovemment grants are generally deducted from the cost of the relevant ,, 23023 assets.
There is no further explanation. 231 If these are grants to cover debt repayment, and they have an adverse effect on other states, they would be deemed actionable subsidies according to the SCM Agreement. 232 Further investigation would be necessary to determine specifically what the subsidy's function is here. It should be noted that, Volkswagen, like Toyota and Ford, also publishes comprehensive annual reports including financial statements and 233 explanatory notes. This practice greatly enhances transparency and should be promoted by the WTO.
Finally, the largest Korean auto manufacturers are Hyundai Motors and Kia Motors. 234 These both trade on the Korean Stock Exchange, and although Kia publishes its consolidated financial reports on its website, Hyundai does not. 235 Hyundai's lack of available information reinforces the conclusion that transparency in accounting is crucial to the WTO ability to determine whether illegal subsidization occurs.
This survey indicates that, like the major Chinese auto manufacturers, other world leaders in the auto industry also receive government subsidies. 236 However, the other world leaders are clearly distinguishable from the Chinese manufacturers: with the exception of Hyundai, the largest manufacturers of the other leading countries all publish very thorough annual reports, which not only include financial statements, but provide accompanying explanatory notes as well.
237 While calculating precise subsidy amounts is beyond the scope of this Note, exemplifying certain areas of concern characterized by sparse disclosure still invites a reconsideration of the SCM Agreement's authority and the authority of the WTO more broadly. 238 PART IV: REASSESSMENT countermeasures. '243 This provision essentially says that if dispute resolution in the WTO forum fails, then the injured country has discretion to correct the situation itself. 244 To analogize, if an American trial court rendered a judgment against a defendant, and the defendant then refused to pay damages within the specified time period, this would be akin to the court then authorizing the plaintiff to engage in self-help to recover whatever damages he/she could. The more logical approach would be to impose fines on the defendant or sentence the defendant to confinement in order to avoid further injury to either party. Similarly, a more efficient and sensible WTO remedial scheme would involve fines for established cases of prohibited subsidization or, depending on the severity and continuity of the violation, expulsion from the organization. If a Member state must ultimately handle its own economic grievances, then the findings of WTO dispute resolution proceedings are non-binding. 245 They become mere suggestions that the offending state desist its violation, and they fail as actual remedies.
Where injurious subsidization has been found and the offending state has not terminated the subsidy, the complaining state may impose countervailing duties "only as long as and to the extent necessary to counteract subsidization which is causing injury. 246 This removes any incentive the offending state may have had to withdraw the subsidy; if it subsidizes to its benefit against the world, and only certain other states impose countervailing duties, then the offending state still benefits from the subsidy and is not deterred from maintaining it.
Two paragraphs later, the SCM Agreement says, "[n]otwithstanding [the above duration provision], any definitive countervailing duty shall be terminated on a date not later than five years from its imposition.. unless the authorities determine... that the expiry of the duty would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of subsidization and injury. 247 In other words, the injured state may impose countervailing duties for as long as the subsidizing state wishes to maintain its illegal subsidy. Again, the subsidizing state would have no incentive to cancel the injurious subsidy, and so it could continue violating the SCM Agreement with virtually no consequence while simultaneously reaping the benefits of the illegal subsidy.
The remedies provided in the SCM Agreement for injury by subsidization are inefficient and ineffective. They are inefficient in the sense that the dispute resolution process may take several months and generate substantial administrative costs, only for the problem to be deferred back to the complaining state to counteract appropriately. 248 
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would likely have little interest in reaching an agreement through dispute resolution when it could simply ignore any recommendation to terminate the subsidy and wait for the complaining state to use countermeasures against it.
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The SCM Agreement remedies are ineffective in that they do not provide the aggrieved state with any assurance that the illegal subsidy at issue, or others, will not be utilized against the state again, that they do not provide terms of compensation to the injured state, that there is no binding power of the DSB's recommendations, and that they ultimately allow the states to decide on subsidization counteractions themselves. 25°B .
The Weight of Authority of WTO and the Importance of a System of International Trade That Calls for Transparency
The WTO is a unique international organization in that it is operated entirely by its Member states, and there is no concentration of power in any organizational head or board of directors. 25 ' As such, the Member states ultimately determine the course of action in disputes in areas such as illegal subsidization. 252 This could be considered either a great source of power or a great weakness; however, unless the WTO can require of its Member states accurate accounting and transparency in terms of finances and trading policies, and successfully demand their reform in the face of deficiency, the WTO cannot be understood as a body of any great authority. Furthermore, the power of the WTO is only as great as its members' willingness to abide by the agreements they have adopted. Therefore, if a state can violate its WTO obligations by illegally subsidizing an industry, ignore directions to terminate the subsidy, and wait until the injured country counteracts, when ultimately the dispute is out of the WTO's control and is left to the injured state, the WTO has diminished authority. As the WTO itself states, "the preferred solution is for the countries concerned to discuss their problems and settle the dispute by themselves., 253 While this Member-run approach evidences strength in democracy, it also functions as a limit to authority: the Member states have final say, as opposed to a governing body within the organization.
The automotive industry is the largest manufacturing industry in the United States, 25 4 and it will face intense competition in the years ahead as China rises as an automotive superpower. 2 55 Therefore, it should be a major U.S.
